In this issue of What We’re Reading, we explore the bourgeois commentariat’s peculiar inability to understand young people, the relationship between household debt and working-class resistance, the crisis of republican legitimacy in France, the political and social contradictions of Syria’s post-Assad transition, the dispossession of Damascus residents in the name of reconstruction, and Egypt’s real-estate boom and the class interests behind its ever-expanding concrete horizons.
World
The young are conformists in denial — Janan Ganesh, Financial Times
Leave it to the Financial Times’ resident dandy, Janan Ganesh, to gaze across a burning planet, note the generational wreckage left behind by four decades of neoliberal plunder, and arrive at the triumphant conclusion that the kids are simply clamoring for a more efficiently run stock exchange.
In his latest monstrosity, Ganesh takes the raw, defensive battles of a working class under siege, stripping them of every shred of material reality, and repackaging them as the quiet yearning for petty bourgeois respectability.
The column’s premise is astonishingly smug, even by his own standards. Young people who protest crumbling schools in France, corrupt medical entrance exams in India, or unpayable rents in London are not really revolting against the system. “What the students want”, he insists, “is a proper functioning of the merit-based, study-and-work social order, not an alternative to it. A fairer rat race but a rat race.” Ganesh calls this “reassuringly bourgeois”.
To dissect this drivel requires distinguishing between bourgeois psychology and historical materialism. Ganesh suffers from an acute, terminal case of capitalist realism, i.e., the total inability to conceptualize human agency outside the market form, and the active, purposeful push by the neoliberal right to transform the attitudes of both the general population and the left towards capitalism. When French high schoolers demand well-funded public education, or when Indian students take to the streets over the structural rot of higher education, Ganesh cannot fathom that these are defensive mobilizations over the means of social reproduction.
Under capitalism, the working class must fight to reproduce itself before it can do anything else. When the state strips away the social wage—gutting public universities, commodifying healthcare, privatizing the housing stock—the initial outbreak of class conflict is inevitably defensive. Workers and students mobilize around the immediate point of rupture, which today is the right to an education that doesn’t plunge them into debt peonage, the right to shelter that doesn’t consume three-quarters of their labor, and the demand that the state provide the bare conditions of survival. To mistake this minimum program for an ideological endorsement of the “rat race” is the hallmark of a commentator whose political imagination begins and ends at the door of the club of reforming the status quo…only to say the same thing a few years later.
Ganesh’s grotesque formulation on housing gives the game away entirely. Rent strikes, tenant unions, and demands for social housing in London, Tirana, or Milan are dismissed as naive, and once these fail, Ganesh purrs, “the larger issue should dawn on them”, and the young will finally realize that their true ally is deregulation and that they’re “more aligned with market forces than those of the ‘conservative’ old”.
I would go on, but I fear for my veins.
Paris Saint-Germain sparkle on the pitch while the city of light burns around them — Barney Ronay, The Guardian
As most of his work usually is, Ronay’s column is an exceptional piece of observation, comfortably sitting at the intersection of sports, politics, humor, and the economy.
Writing as PSG played Barcelona at the Parc des Princes in a lit-up Paris, Ronay refuses to treat the pitch as a pristine bubble sealed off from the street battles shaking the French capital. Instead, he leans directly into Guy Debord to capture the collision between hyper-commodified entertainment and urban insurrection, aptly quipping, “the Society of the Spectacle, you say? Actually, I think we’re past that now. Hold the society bit. We’ll just take the spectacle.”
Inside the ground, a multi-million-euro Qatari light show dazzles the stands; outside, over two thousand protesters sit in police police custody as hundreds of burned rental bikes pile up in the squares.
Unlike the smug Ganesh, he has no interest in moralizing the rioting youth. While the French state apparatus threatens military deployments, Ronay plainly diagnoses the material reality behind the unrest: youth unemployment is close to 20%, social atomization, and the banishment of the working class to the periphery of a museumified city. As he puts it, Paris has become a place where the young live “inside a box, noses pressed up against the glass, peering through your binoculars at the city of someone else’s love.”
The club itself is laid bare not just as a vanity project, but as the concrete fusion of imperial diplomacy and late-capitalist spectacle. While Emmanuel Macron blusters about crushing street disorder, he does so on a tarmac in Doha alongside Sheikh Tamim—the very oligarch underwriting the spectacle and commanding French military personnel on Gulf bases.
As Egyptians, the dynamic is very much on the nose. We know intimately how Gulf capital and coercive state power collaborate to turn public culture into brand equity, using gated spectacles to drown out the structural misery outside the walls. Ronay recognizes that the teenagers dodging tear gas in Place de la République wearing PSG tracksuits are the living contradiction of a system that sells them identity as a consumer commodity while denying them the bare conditions of survival.
How does debt exploit workers in the 21st century? — Photis Lysandrou, translated by Serry Abu El-Muna, Sifr
As far as I can tell from the review, Gouzoulis’s argument is an important contribution to understanding how household debt is reshaping working-class power under contemporary capitalism in the global north. His central contention is that household debt, including mortgages, student loans and medical debt, has become a mechanism of labor discipline.
Indebted workers have more to lose when they confront their employers, which makes them less willing to strike, organize or resist deteriorating conditions. Gouzoulis calls this “debt-forced silencing”: financial obligations constrain workers’ capacity for collective resistance.
The argument has real merit, and it is a useful introduction for readers new to Marxist analysis. It challenges the treatment of indebtedness as an individual failure of financial management rather than a structural feature of capitalist social relations, as well as the conventional separation between the workplace and the household.
In this respect it resonates with Marx’s “silent compulsion” of economic relations, through which workers are made to sell their labor power not by direct coercion but through their material dependence on wages. Household debt intensifies that dependence and extends capitalist discipline from the workplace into everyday life.
Nevertheless, several qualifications are needed.
The first concerns the relationship between household debt and capitalism’s wider crisis tendencies. Gouzoulis emphasizes the capacity of credit expansion to compensate for declining workers’ purchasing power and sustain aggregate demand, but, frankly, this risks sliding into an underconsumptionist explanation of the crisis.
British socialist Chris Harman argued in Zombie Capitalism that the expansion of credit since the 1970s has to be understood against declining profitability, weak productive investment and capital’s difficulty in finding sufficiently profitable outlets for accumulation.
Household indebtedness is therefore also a symptom of capitalism’s underlying contradictions, with credit temporarily postponing and displacing problems it cannot resolve.
And while the growth of financial institutions and household credit has undoubtedly changed the relationship between workers and capital, finance should not be conceived as operating apart from productive capital.
This also raises a question about the meaning of exploitation.
Strictly speaking, exploitation takes place in production, where capital appropriates surplus labor. Interest on household debt is different, since it is a deduction from wages, a redistribution of value that has already been produced.
I would argue that household debt does two things at once: it intensifies the exploitation of labor by weakening workers’ capacity to resist, and it takes a further portion of their wages through interest and other financial charges.
“But that’s just semantics,” one might say. It is not.
If debt constitutes a separate relation of exploitation, the implication is a distinct politics of debtors. If it primarily reinforces the existing relation between capital and labor, the central strategic question remains how to strengthen working-class organization and resistance at the point of production.
The link between debt and militancy also needs qualification. Indebtedness can certainly make industrial action harder, but it would be a mistake to treat it as the determining explanation for declining strike activity.
The defeats suffered by workers’ movements in the 1980s, the restructuring of production and the conservative role of trade union bureaucracies offer more substantial explanations for the long-term weakening of organized labor. Especially since indebtedness and falling living standards can just as easily reinforce the conviction that workers have little left to lose.
These questions matter all the more when we turn to Gouzoulis’s proposals. His emphasis on debtor organizing, tenant movements and worker-owned financial cooperatives points to valuable forms of solidarity. But the idea of democratizing finance through alternative institutions operating within capitalism raises familiar problems.
Rosa Luxemburg’s critique of cooperatives in Reform or Revolution applies by extension: institutions operating in a competitive capitalist market cannot escape the pressures that market imposes. Democratic structures do not, by themselves, overcome the social relations that structure accumulation.
We are not reformists, but we support every reform.
Nothing, however, can substitute for independent working-class organization and power in the workplace. Workers have a distinctive collective capacity because they can interrupt the production process on which capital depends.
The debt question therefore has to be tied to the wider struggle over ownership and control of production and finance, which means demands such as cancelling working-class debt and placing the banks under workers’ control, not only building alternative lenders.
Region
Fury of the Despised — Fouad Ghorbali, Sifr
Tunisian sociologist Fouad Ghorbali analyses the crisis of republican legitimacy in France, offering a useful account of the growing distance between the egalitarian promises of republican institutions and the lived experiences of those increasingly excluded from their benefits.
Neoliberal reforms have widened the gap between formal equality and material inequality, while Macron’s technocratic government has increasingly removed distributive questions from democratic debate. The resulting discontent is met with an increasingly punitive security apparatus, while immigration and national identity are mobilized to redirect popular anger away from its social and economic causes.
The article’s strength lies in identifying how social discontent is fragmented and redirected: the ruling class benefits when workers understand their common problems through national or racial antagonism rather than their shared position within capitalist relations. It is also right to reject the idea that the police constitute a politically neutral institution whose interventions are simply responses to disorder.
Nevertheless, the article’s analytical framework raises several questions. The first concerns the relationship between political legitimacy and the material dynamics of capitalism.
While Ghorbali highlights important dimensions of political experience, he does not adequately explain why the French state has pursued the policies generating such discontent.
Attacks on pensions, public services and working conditions are not the ideological preferences of a technocratic elite, so much as part of the wider dynamics of capitalist accumulation, competition and profitability.
As Harman repeatedly emphasizes, the state does not operate independently of capitalist social relations—its policies are shaped by the need to maintain the conditions for accumulation, even when doing so produces intense social conflict.
A second difficulty concerns the article’s understanding of the republic itself.
Ghorbali presents the crisis as a contradiction between the egalitarian promise of republican institutions and their increasingly unequal operation. There is force in this argument, particularly when demonstrators continue to invoke republican values while confronting the institutions claiming to represent them. Yet can the republican ideal serve as an adequate political horizon?
The modern republic emerged alongside capitalist social relations, establishing formal political equality alongside profound material inequality.
Citizens may possess equal legal rights while remaining radically unequal in their relationship to property, production and economic power. Formal equality is itself part of the institutional framework through which capitalist class relations are reproduced.
The problem, therefore, is not simply that the republic has betrayed its egalitarian ideals, but that genuine social equality remains fundamentally incompatible with capitalist class relations. This does not make democratic rights unimportant or republican aspirations irrelevant; rather, they must be defended while exposing the limits imposed upon them by capitalism.
A third, and perhaps more significant, limitation is the relative absence of working-class agency and political strategy. In Ghorbali’s account, popular anger appears primarily as a response to humiliation, exclusion and institutional contempt.
Yet how might this anger develop into an organized challenge to capitalist power? Where are the workplaces in this analysis? What role can strikes and collective industrial action play in transforming dispersed discontent into an effective political force?
May 1968 remains a decisive example of how student revolt can develop into a wider working-class confrontation, with millions of workers participating in a general strike. The transformative potential of social movements depends largely on its connection to organized working-class power.
The article’s treatment of state repression also requires probing. While the concept of the punitive state captures the increasing reliance on policing and coercion to manage social conflict, repression is by no means a neoliberal novelty. The state’s capacity to maintain existing property relations rests not only on ideological consent and institutional legitimacy, but also on its monopoly of organized force.
In France, this must be understood alongside the colonial history of policing and the ways colonial practices have shaped the treatment of racialized populations within metropolitan France. The policing of suburban youth cannot be separated from this history.
Finally, the relative absence of an analysis of the far right is a significant omission. A crisis of republican legitimacy does not automatically produce a progressive alternative. Popular anger can be channeled into working-class solidarity, but it can equally be appropriated by nationalist forces directing social grievances against migrants, Muslims and other racialized groups.
Overall, Ghorbali offers a valuable account of the contradictions between republican equality and contemporary French society. Yet his emphasis on recognition and legitimacy leaves insufficiently explored the material foundations of the crisis and the possibilities for overcoming it through collective working-class action.
The Fall of the Regime is Not Enough: Towards Democratic and Social Change in Syria — The Frontline
The editorial offers a distinctly revolutionary account of Syria’s post-Assad transition, and it is a welcome one. Its central argument is that the fall of the dictatorship has not resolved the social and political conditions that produced the 2011 revolution.
An authoritarian, sectarian and militia-based authority has replaced the old regime, while reconstruction through privatization and real-estate speculation is reorganizing the Syrian bourgeoisie rather than democratizing society.
Its alternative rests on independent popular committees, trade unions, a constituent assembly, transitional justice, public ownership of strategic resources, and a united front against the new authorities.
The editorial rightly rejects the assumption that overthrowing a dictatorship automatically resolves the democratic and social questions behind a revolution. That may sound like common sense, but it is far from the default view. Political democracy cannot be separated from economic power and social ownership.
Unfortunately, the contents are a little disappointing given the headline.
First, the editorial calls the new authority “Thermidorian.”
The term comes from the coup of 9 Thermidor in 1794, the reaction within the French Revolution that ended Jacobin rule. As I understand it, Trotsky borrowed the term to describe the bureaucratic reaction against the gains of the Russian Revolution. Both uses presuppose a revolution that had already taken power.
The Syrian revolution, however, never consolidated popular power nationally, let alone established a workers’ state. Its local coordination committees, councils and popular organizations, while numerous at the start, were quickly crushed, displaced or subordinated to armed factions amid repression, militarization, and foreign intervention.
Assad’s fall is the outcome of a defeated revolution and a reorganization of political authority, not a Thermidorian (counter-revolutionary) reversal of an established revolutionary power.
The editorial also calls the new authority fascist, which is odd for a group in the Trotskyist tradition. In that tradition, fascism means a specific counter-revolutionary movement, historically based on a mass petty-bourgeois mobilization and aimed at violently destroying independent working-class organizations (neither of which exist at the moment).
A third limitation concerns the economic crisis. The September fuel-price increases exposed the vulnerability of a population facing deteriorating living conditions. Reuters described the resulting protests as the most widespread since Assad’s fall.
The Energy Ministry attributed the increases to higher global procurement costs and heavy import dependence. That does not excuse the price rise, but the crisis cannot be explained solely by the failures of the new authorities. An import-dependent economy is also under regional and global pressure, and a class analysis has to include it.
Additionally, the September demonstrations were not workplace struggles.
The editorial identifies workers, peasants, youth, women, and marginalized groups as the agents of transformation, yet it leaves unexplored how these forces could build sustained collective power, and above all how consumer anger might connect to the capacity of workers to halt production.
The key question here is who controls the production, distribution and use of resources, and in whose interests. The call for public ownership under “democratic control” should say whether it means workers’ control, and what enforces it.
Overall, Frontline offers a politically valuable intervention, particularly in its insistence that the overthrow of Assad cannot be equated with the emancipation of Syrian society. But it falls short of what its headline promises.
Who Owns the New Damascus? — Ghadeer Mohamed, Khatt30
This investigative feature provides a revealing account of the social consequences of Decree 66 and the Marota City and Basilia City development projects in Damascus.
Through the experiences of people whose homes were demolished between 2012 and 2018, the article documents how residents have been transformed from homeowners into holders of regulatory shares, often without receiving meaningful compensation or the ability to reclaim their former homes.
Disputed valuations, speculative brokers purchasing shares at heavily discounted prices, contractors demanding disproportionate portions of the developed property, and the repression of protest organizers expose the realities behind the language of urban reconstruction.
The article is particularly valuable because it gives concrete expression to a process identified in broader discussions of Syria’s post-Assad transition: the reorganization of the Syrian bourgeoisie through privatization, property speculation, and the appropriation of urban land. Reconstruction is not simply the rebuilding of a country devastated by war. It is also a political and economic process determining who controls land, who benefits from redevelopment, and who bears its costs.
The destruction of working-class neighborhoods and their replacement with luxury developments recalls Engels’s discussion of bourgeois solutions to the housing question.
In The Housing Question, he describes how urban redevelopment frequently addresses the problems of overcrowding and inadequate housing by displacing the working population rather than resolving its conditions of existence.
The Damascus projects offer a contemporary illustration. Plans for thousands of luxury apartments, with prices reportedly reaching 1,000–2,500 US dollars per square meter, stand in stark contrast to the circumstances of displaced families, including pensioners whose rental payments exceed their pensions. Who is Damascus being reconstructed for?
The transformation of land ownership into regulatory shares is equally significant. Residents who once possessed homes and property now hold financial claims whose value is determined by administrative decisions, market speculation and negotiations with developers. These shares can subsequently be purchased by brokers at extremely low prices, allowing financial actors to accumulate claims over land from people whose economic circumstances leave them little choice but to sell.
As Luxemburg argued, dispossession is an ongoing feature of capitalist expansion.
The article also reveals how financial vulnerability reinforces this process. Residents facing demolition notices, mounting rental costs, and uncertain compensation are particularly vulnerable to selling their shares below their potential value. The account of a resident who borrowed substantial sums to renovate a property shortly before receiving notice of demolition illustrates how debt can compound dispossession.
Another important dimension concerns the gendered character of property relations. The article describes how replacement housing was allocated according to actual occupancy rather than legal ownership, frequently benefiting sons while excluding daughters who formally owned property.
The continued use of legal and repressive mechanisms inherited from the Assad era is also revealing. The prosecution of activists organizing against Decree 66, alongside restrictions on demonstrations, demonstrates the continuity of coercive state institutions despite the change in political leadership.
Political personnel may change while the institutional mechanisms protecting property and state authority remain largely intact.
Nevertheless, the struggle against Decree 66 also raises questions about the political demands around which resistance should develop.
The campaign for a larger share of developed property and fairer compensation is understandable, particularly given the scale of dispossession. But it remains largely within the framework of the existing developer-led model of urban reconstruction.
Here, Damascus can learn from Cairo. Residents need to make their demands wider: no demolition without guaranteed rehousing, public housing developed according to social need, democratic planning through residents’ committees, and the use of urban land for those who live and work in the city rather than for speculative investment.
There is also a question of who is included in the struggle. The article understandably centers property owners, but tenants, informal occupants without title deeds, and the workers who built and maintained these neighborhoods are largely absent. A movement organized exclusively around property rights risks reproducing the exclusions it seeks to overcome.
The housing question cannot be reduced to the interests of existing owners, important as their struggle is. It concerns the right of the entire working population to secure and affordable housing.
A brilliant investigation worth the read.
* Honorary mention: We loved Jasmine Khelil’s Imagining Palestine Beyond Statehood but did not have the time to do it justice in a review. Still, of this list, this is our favorite long-read.
Egypt
A City Without an Identifiable Owner: How Real Estate Capital Has Transformed Egypt into Cities for Speculation — Hisham Gaafar, Sifr
Gaafar maps a detailed account of Egypt’s real-estate boom and the political economy underpinning the expansion of new cities and coastal megaprojects. His central argument is that this expansion is neither simply the product of foreign investment nor an ordinary response to housing demand, rather, it rests on a system in which the state, through the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA), controls and allocates vast areas of land to a relatively small group of developers.
Gulf capital has subsequently entered and expanded an existing model of accumulation, while households increasingly purchase property as a store of value against inflation and currency devaluation. Installment-based financing transfers considerable construction and market risks to buyers, with the growing assignment market providing early indications of the vulnerabilities within this model.
The article’s strongest contribution is its rejection of a nationalist explanation that attributes Egypt’s real-estate problems primarily to foreign capital. By demonstrating the central role of Egyptian developers and the state as the principal allocator of land, Gaafar identifies the domestic class relations underlying the expansion. Again, this model already existed, Gulf investment merely entered it.
Through land sales, auctions and partnership arrangements, the state (through NUCA) effectively operates as a major landowner, deriving income from control over access to land, and acting as an active participant in the accumulation process.
Additionally, Gaafar points out that installment-based purchases allow developers to finance construction through buyers’ future payments, transferring substantial risks to households. Property becomes a financial asset and protection against devaluation rather than necessarily a home.
The growing assignment market exposes the fragility of this model, as buyers unable to sustain payments attempt to sell their contractual claims, sometimes before receiving their properties.
The deeper problem, obviously, is that housing increasingly serves wealth accumulation rather than social need. This is particularly stark given the coexistence of widespread housing insecurity and the reported 12.5 million vacant units in the 2017 census.
Nevertheless, the article’s five conditions for restoring the public character of urban development remain largely procedural. Transparency, published contracts, and community participation are worthwhile, but they do not challenge who owns land or determines its use.
Participation without decision-making power is little more than consultation.
A more radical program would include requisitioning persistently vacant properties for public housing, rent controls, protection against eviction, and democratic public control over urban development.
The article also neglects the agents of resistance. Construction workers, whose casualized and often dangerous labor makes these developments possible, barely feature. Nor does it sufficiently engage with struggles such as the resistance of residents—from Warraq and Old Manial to Toson and Hayy Gamil.
The military’s economic position also deserves far greater attention than it is given. Research based on listed companies cannot adequately capture military-linked commercial structures. The armed forces are an active economic actor with interests in land, construction, and investment.
Finally, whose crisis does the article describe?
Buyers struggling to sell their contractual claims face genuine financial insecurity, but many belong to middle and upper-middle classes seeking to protect their savings through property investment.
Their difficulties should not eclipse those of tenants, informal residents, displaced populations, and workers who have never accessed this market. Buyer protection is legitimate, but housing justice must begin with those who need homes, not those who own investment properties.
Overall, Jaafar offers a valuable account of the relationship between state-controlled land, domestic capital, Gulf investment, and household financialization. Yet his proposed remedies remain largely within market transparency and procedural reform, when what we should be seeking is an answer as to how to challenge the class relations determining who controls land and housing.
*What We’re Reading is a fortnightly list of the stories behind the headlines, read through the lens of class and power.




The argument by Hisham Gaafar that you review here (about the real estate market involving the state, Gulf investors, and a small number of Egyptian real estate developers) seems to align with the argument made by Hassan el-Berberi*, in the same newsletter (Sifr): Berberi argues that even when foreign actors invest in Egyptian real estate it is Egyptian domestic capital and assets that fund projects, with profits then expatriated to the foreign investors which seems to confirm Gaafar's rejection of attributing Egypt’s real-estate problems primarily to foreign capital.
* من يدفع كلفة المشاريع في مصر؟ ومن يجني أرباحها؟, حسن البربري, https://alsifr.org/egypts-locally-funded-foreign-investment